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I. Introduction
Articulated as a priority in President Trump’s executive
orders, his administration has forcefully pushed to sign more
287(g) agreements (and more aggressive forms of those
agreements) with local law enforcement agencies (LEAs). 1 In the
summer of 2017, the administration signed eighteen new
* Professor of Law, Texas A&M University School of Law; A.B., Harvard
College; J.D., Harvard Law School. I am grateful to my hard-working team of
research assistants: Maddie Churchman, Ryan Kinkade, Emma Martin, and
Daniel Weinstein.
1. See Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8800 (Jan. 25, 2017)
(expanding federal-state agreements); Amanda Sakuma, Donald Trump’s Plan to
Outsource Immigration Enforcement to Local Cops, ATLANTIC (Feb. 18, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/02/trump-immigration-enforce
ment/517071/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (discussing Trump’s plan to enlist the
assistance of local authorities to carry out his immigration plans) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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agreements in the state of Texas alone. 2 At the end of 2017, there
were at least thirty-eight other LEAs interested in joining the
program. 3 Once these agreements come online, the result will be
more local law enforcement officers deputized to enforce
immigration laws than have ever existed in the history of the
287(g) program.
What are the implications of this deputization? On one level,
we have had greater than fifteen years’ experience with 287(g)
agreements, so we could expect this administration’s resurrection
of the program to result in more of the same dynamic that we have
seen in past years. But given this administration’s plans to
significantly expand the program, together with other components
of its aggressive immigration policies, this Article suggests that
implementation of the 287(g) program under the Trump
administration will look different, in significantly harsher ways,
than under previous administrations.
First, the profile of immigrants who are deported through this
program under the Trump administration will likely look different
from those deported under the Obama administration. Upon
taking office, President Trump revoked policies instituted under
the Obama administration that prioritized the removal of recently
arrived immigrants and those with serious criminal histories. 4
These Obama priorities, in turn, placed restrictions on the types of
immigrants who could be removed through federal–sub-federal
2. See ICE Announces 18 New 287(g) Agreements in Texas, U.S. IMMIGR. &
CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (July 31, 2017), https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/iceannounces-18-new-287g-agreements- texas (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (noting the
increase in the number of agreements ICE has entered into since 2016) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
3. See Mica Rosenberg & Reade Levinson, Police in Trump-Supporting
Towns Aid Immigration Officials in Crackdown, REUTERS (Nov. 27, 2017, 6:16
AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-trump-effect-immigration-police/policein-trump-supporting-towns-aid-immigration-officials-in-crackdown-idUSKBN1
DR169 (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (reporting that police departments across the
nation have been deputized to assist in the immigration plans under the Trump
administration) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). See generally
REUTERS, 287(G) GRAPHICS DATA, (2017), http://fingfx.thomsonreuters.com/gfx/
rngs/TRUMP-EFFECT-IMMIGRATION-POLICE/010051YZ4FG/287ggraphics%
20data.pdf (highlighting the increased interest of law enforcement agencies
seeking to assist in Trump’s immigration programming).
4. See Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8800 (Jan. 25, 2017)
(expanding the enforcement and removal priorities).
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cooperation programs. 5 Trump’s revocation of the Obama
administration’s priorities, and his assertion of his own long list of
broadly worded new enforcement “priorities” means that,
effectively, all immigrants with unauthorized status are now
priorities for removal. 6 Trickling down to the 287(g) context,
deputized local law enforcement seem to have much more latitude
to target all immigrants for immigration enforcement, without
regard for their actual dangerousness.
Second, the 287(g) program under the Trump administration
may employ more powerful forms of agreements than existed
under the Obama administration. Through his executive orders,
President Trump has expressed a willingness to resurrect the task
force model (which would broaden powers and geographic range to
LEAs compared to the more traditional jailhouse enforcement
model), a model the Obama administration phased out in 2012
amid concerns about its special vulnerability to racial profiling. 7
And in an agency memo, the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) gave permission to Customs and Border Protection
(CBP) to sign 287(g) agreements, rather than limiting agreements
to Immigration and Customs Enforcement (the agency responsible
for interior immigration enforcement and the traditional federal
partner for 287(g) agreements). 8 The combination of these
5. See Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y of Homeland Sec.,
U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S.
Immigration & Customs Enf’t (Nov. 20, 2014), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/
files/publications/14_1120_memo_prosecutorial_discretion.pdf (outlining new
policies and guidelines with respect to the apprehension, detention, and removal
of aliens in the United States) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
6. See David A. Martin, Trump’s Order on the Deportation of Undocumented
Residents, Annotated by an Immigration Law Expert, VOX, https://www.
sanctuary-trump (last updated Jan. 31, 2017) (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (noting
the broadly sweeping language used in the Trump administration executive
orders) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
7. See FY 2012: ICE Announces Year-End Removal Numbers, Highlights
Focus on Key Priorities and Issues New National Detainer Guidance to Further
Focus Resources, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (Dec. 20, 2012),
https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/fy-2012-ice-announces-year-end-removalnumbers-highlights-focus-key-priorities-and (last visited Sept. 18, 2018)
[hereinafter FY 2012: ICE Announces Year-End Removal Numbers] (reporting
year-end removal numbers and setting forth guidelines highlighting the priorities
for removal) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
8. See Read the Memos Signed by DHS Secretary Kelly on New Guidelines
for Deporting Illegal Immigrants, WASH. POST (Feb. 17, 2017),
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potentially more potent forms of agreements, together with the
new policy making every immigrant a removal priority, could be
combustible: newly deputized local law enforcement officers could
effectively operate like fully empowered immigration agents,
questioning and detaining people encountered on the streets based
on immigration status.
The third difference is the Trump administration’s seeming
lack of concern for the racial profiling and other civil rights dangers
inherent in 287(g) programs. Critics of sub-federal enforcement of
immigration laws—and even some proponents—point to
substantial evidence that local law enforcement officers who have
concurrent immigration authority often target individuals for
criminal law action based on accent or skin color, knowing that
those individuals will likely face removal proceedings. 9 Singular
among administrations that have implemented the 287(g)
program, the Trump administration has shown little interest in
protecting the civil rights of immigrants. The 287(g) agreements
signed by the Trump administration continue to require local
agencies to abide by federal civil rights laws and continue to
provide a complaint process for reporting misconduct. 10 But Mr.
Trump’s statements on this subject as a candidate and his action
as President raise serious doubts that civil rights violations
committed under the authority of a 287(g) agreement will be
prosecuted.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part II provides a brief
history of the 287(g) program, including its iterations under
different presidential administrations. Part III analyzes the role of
these agreements in the Trump administration’s enforcement
http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/documents/national/read-the-memos-signedby-dhs-secretary-kelly-on-new-guidelines-for-deporting-illegal-immigrants/2338/
(last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (explaining the new guidelines for deportation of
illegal aliens and the expansion of enforcement entities to fulfill the new plans)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
9. See The 287(g) Program: An Overview, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (Mar. 15,
2017), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/287g-programimmigration (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (explaining the 287(g) program) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
10. See generally, e.g., U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, MEMORANDUM OF
AGREEMENT (2017), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/287gMOA/TarrantCounty Sheriff.
pdf (containing an agreement between ICE and the Tarrant County Sherriff’s
Office).
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policies, focusing on their rapid expansion, especially in the border
areas; this section also considers the implications of this rapid
deputization. In Part IV I offer some concluding thoughts.
II. 287(g) Program: History and Early Operations
A. Congress’s Vision
The 287(g) program was enacted as part of the omnibus Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(IIRIRA), 11 which substantially increased penalties on immigrants
who violated U.S. law (either as unauthorized immigrants who
violated immigration laws or authorized immigrants who violated
other laws). 12 Though there is abundant legislative history for
IIRIRA generally, very little exists to explain why Congress
decided to enact the 287(g) program at this point in time, or in this
particular form.
Against this sparse legislative history, we turn to the
statutory language. Section 287(g) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act 13 authorizes the Department of Homeland
Security to enter into agreements with a state or political
subdivision “to perform a function of an immigration officer in
relation to the investigation, apprehension, or detention of aliens
in the United States (including the transportation of such aliens
across State lines to detention centers) . . . .” 14 The specifics of the
immigration functions are left to DHS and the state or political
subdivision to negotiate through a written agreement. 15 The
statute further provides that the 287(g) officers (a subset of the
larger local law enforcement agency) will continue to be paid by
11. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
12. See Dara Lind, The Disastrous, Forgotten 1996 Law that Created Today’s
Immigration Law, VOX (April 28, 2016, 8:40 AM), https://www.vox.com/2016/
4/28/11515132/iirira-clinton-immigration (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (discussing
the impact of the 1996 immigration bill in the wake of legislation passed in the
Reagan administration) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
13. 8 U.S.C. § 1357 (2012).
14. Id.
15. See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(5) (2012) (outlining the performance of
immigration officer functions by state officers and employees).
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their local agencies 16 and must receive federal certification that
they have been trained on relevant federal immigration laws. 17
The key to understanding 287(g) agreements is to understand
that 287(g) delegates officers federal powers. In contrast to other
federal–sub-federal cooperation programs, these officers are not
merely exercising their own enforcement authority in partnership
with federal immigration agencies; rather, they are receiving
federal immigration powers to use, albeit under federal
supervision. For example, through the Criminal Alien Program
(CAP), LEAs provide ICE with lists of detainees held in their jails
and allow ICE access (either physical access or video access) to
interview detainees of interest. 18 The cooperation sought from
LEAs under this program focuses on powers that the LEAs already
have as part of their law enforcement authority: information on
detainees they have arrested for non-immigration reasons and
access to those detainees within their jails.
Similarly,
through
the
newly-resurrected
Secure
Communities program, LEAs are asked to detain immigrants of
interest beyond their usual release date, to allow ICE more time to
pick them up and place them in removal proceedings. 19 Again,
LEAs are being asked to use their pre-existing criminal law powers
to assist ICE with immigration law enforcement. That LEAs use
their own criminal enforcement powers in honoring ICE detainer
requests has been underscored in federal judicial decisions issued
in cases challenging the constitutionality of detainer holds. For

16. See id. § 1357(g)(1) (discussing the particular powers of the Attorney
General in entering agreements with a State).
17. See id. § 1357(g)(2) (noting the restrictions on State power in performing
an agreement entered into with the Attorney General).
18. See ANDREA GUTTIN, IMMIGR. POLICY CTR., THE CRIMINAL ALIEN PROGRAM:
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT IN TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS, 1, 5 (2010),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/Crimin
al_Alien_Program_021710.pdf (providing a detailed analysis of immigration
policies in Texas).
19. See Secretary Napolitano Announces New Agreement for State and Local
Immigration Enforcement Partnerships & Adds 11 New Agreements, U.S. DEP’T
OF HOMELAND SECURITY (July 10, 2009), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2009/07/10/
secretary-announces-new-agreement-state-and-local-immigration-enforcement
(last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (“[P]articipating local law enforcement agencies are
required to pursue all criminal charges that originally caused the offender to be
taken into custody.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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example, in Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas County, 20 the district
court held that the sheriff’s office violated the plaintiff immigrant’s
Fourth Amendment rights when it continued to hold her beyond
her release date based on an ICE detainer request; though ICE
might have had legal authority to detain the immigrant for those
additional days, the LEA could not piggyback on ICE’s civil
authority to detain when it was exercising its criminal detention
powers. 21
By contrast, when an LEA signs a 287(g) agreement, it
receives new powers related to immigration enforcement that it did
not previously possess. For example, when the Hall County
Sheriff’s Office 22 signed a 287(g) agreement in 2016, it gained the
power to interrogate detainees about their immigration status,
process detainees for immigration violations, serve warrants of
arrest for immigration violations, prepare evidence for immigrant
processing (including taking fingerprints and photographs,
interviewing the immigrant, preparing affidavits and taking sworn
statements for ICE review), preparing charging documents (the
Notice to Appear that officially starts the removal process), issuing
requests for detainers and release information (such as asking
another LEA when it plans to release the immigrant), and
transporting the immigrant to ICE detention facilities. 23 Hall
County’s agreement is a jailhouse model of enforcement, meaning
that the 287(g) functions are limited to the jailhouse, after
immigrants have been arrested for other reasons. As explained in
more detail below, LEAs which agree to a task force model

20. No. 3:12-cv-0217-ST, 2014 WL 1414305 (D. Ore. Apr. 11, 2014).
21. See id. at *11; see also Morales v. Chadbourne, 996 F. Supp. 2d 19, 39
(D.R.I. 2014) (holding that the detention of an immigrant based on an
immigration detainer “for purposes of mere investigation is not permitted.”).
22. Hall County, Georgia is about one hour north of Atlanta. Driving
Directions from Atlanta, GA to Hall County, GA, GOOGLE MAPS,
http://maps.google.com (follow “Directions” hyperlink; then search starting point
field for “Atlanta, GA” and search destination field for “Hall County, GA”).
23. See generally U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, MEMORANDUM OF
AGREEMENT, (2016) [hereinafter HALL COUNTY SHERRIFF’S DEPARTMENT ICE
AGREEMENT],
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/287gMOA/r_287ghallcountyso.pdf
(highlighting an agreement between ICE and the Hall County Sherriff’s
Department).
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agreement have even more expansive immigration-related
powers. 24
With this delegation of its powers, ICE gains more federal
control over 287(g) LEAs (or at least the potential for that control),
as compared with the control it has in other federal–sub-federal
cooperation programs. 25 Much of that control follows from the
statutory structure of the 287(g) program: the LEAs can only
perform the immigration functions that ICE agrees to give them, 26
the individual officers agree to be subject to the “direction and
supervision” of ICE, 27 and notwithstanding that the agreements
have an expiration date, ICE or the LEA can unilaterally decide to
terminate at any time. 28 Beyond the federal statute, the 287(g)
agreements, which ICE drafts and seem to be almost identical in
content, also provide opportunities for ICE to assert control. In
signing the agreements, LEAs generally agree to abide by federal
immigration priorities 29 and federal civil rights laws, 30 to use
federally defined procedures for processing 287(g)-related
complaints, 31 to collect data related to their 287(g) work, 32 to
provide translators as needed, 33 and to meet annually with ICE to
24. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, THE PERFORMANCE OF 287(G)
AGREEMENTS REPORT UPDATE 3 (2010), https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/
OIG_10-124_Sep10.pdf (discussing the increased authority of law enforcement
agencies from agreements entered into with ICE).
25. The federal control that exists in the letter of the law has not always
been borne out in practice. See Notes 62–67 and 79–86 and accompanying text.
26. See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1) (2012) (noting authority of the Attorney
General to enter into agreements with State agencies).
27. See id. § 1357(g)(3) (discussing that State agencies are under the
authority of the Attorney General).
28. See, e.g., HALL COUNTY SHERRIFF’S DEPARTMENT ICE AGREEMENT, supra
note 23, at 10 (detailing the agreement between ICE and the Hall County
Sherriff’s Department).
29. See, e.g., id. at 2 (describing the authorized function of the State within
the agreement with ICE).
30. See, e.g., id. at 8 (detailing the liability and responsibility of the State
agency).
31. See, e.g., id. (noting the federally mandated procedures that must be
followed by the State).
32. See, e.g., id. at 7 (discussing reporting requirements while carrying out
the agreement).
33. See, e.g., id. at 8 (noting requirements to secure the assistance of a
translator if necessary).
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review and ensure compliance with the agreements’
requirements. 34
The deeper level of federal control in the 287(g) program
becomes apparent when contrasted with other federal–sub-federal
cooperation programs. Through Secure Communities, the LEAs
can decide for themselves whether, and to what extent, they want
to honor immigration detainers or inform ICE of immigrants’
release dates. 35 Even when an LEA decides to participate, it can
limit the conditions of its participation, for example, only honoring
detainers for immigrants convicted or charged with serious
crimes. 36 Indeed, most of the sub-federal governments that have
been dubbed “sanctuary” cities or states do not entirely eliminate
cooperation with federal immigration authorities, but rather, limit
the circumstances for that cooperation. For example, San Diego
Police Department’s policy is to report individuals to USCIS only
when police arrest individuals based on probable cause that they
had committed a felony and reasonable suspicion that they have
violated federal immigration laws. 37 Accordingly, San Diego PD is
prohibited from releasing individuals to ICE or Border Patrol who
(1) witnessed a crime, (2) were contacted during a family
disturbance, (3) were involved in a minor traffic offense
(infractions and nonbookable offenses), and (4) are seeking medical
treatment. 38
Equipped with this understanding of congressional intent,
with its combination of delegated federal powers and increased
federal control, we turn now to an analysis of how the 287(g)

34. See, e.g., id. at 9 (outlining the requirement that LEAs meet annually
with ICE to ensure compliance with the terms of the agreement).
35. See Ming H. Chen, Trust in Immigration Enforcement: State
Noncooperation and Sanctuary Cities After Secure Communities, 91 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 13, 35–39 (2016) (detailing how some states have limited the scope of
cooperation with Secure Communities).
36. See id. at 37 (describing California legislation that permitted LEA
cooperation with ICE detainer requests only if the individual committed a violent
felony).
37. See SAN DIEGO POLICE DEPARTMENT PROCEDURE 4 (2014) (citing
California Government Code § 53069.75 preventing local law from prohibiting
reporting to INS where an individual committed a felon and is suspected of
violating immigration law).
38. Id. at 3.
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B. Agreements Under the Bush Administration (2002–2007)
Though authorized by Congress in 1996, the first 287(g)
agreement wasn’t signed until 2002, shortly after the 9/11 attacks.
Those attacks were a catalyst for the 287(g) program and
sub-federal immigration regulation generally. Before the attacks,
the federal government’s longstanding legal position was that
states only had authority to enforce criminal immigration laws. 39
But months after the attacks, Attorney General John Ashcroft
invited states, using their “inherent authority” as sovereigns, to
enforce both civil and criminal immigration laws. 40 Florida was the
first state to respond, signing a 287(g) agreement in 2002 with the
then-Immigration and Naturalization Service. 41
Given its special links to the attacks and apparent
vulnerability to terrorist infiltration (thirteen of the nineteen
hijackers had spent time there, getting Florida driver’s licenses
and attending flight training school in the state), Florida’s
participation made sense, as the federal government emphasized
the program’s national security focus. 42 Florida’s agreement
empowered its newly created Regional Domestic Security Task
39. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ASSISTANCE BY STATE AND LOCAL POLICE IN
APPREHENDING
ILLEGAL
ALIENS
26,
31–32
(Feb.
5,
1996),
https://www.justice.gov/file/20111/download (describing a memorandum from
Legal Counsel of the U.S. Department of Justice to the United States Attorney
for the Southern District of California).
40. Attorney General John Ashcroft, Prepared Remarks on the National
Security
Entry-Exit
Registration
System
(June
6,
2002),
https://www.justice.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2002/060502agpreparedremarks.ht
m (last visited on Sept. 18, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
41. See Memorandum of Understanding Between the INS and the State of
Florida (July 26, 2002), reprinted in 79 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1138, app. II at
1140 (2002) (outlining authority provided to Florida state and local officers).
These officers were trained by the INS and then placed in Florida’s seven Regional
Domestic Security Task Forces. Id. at 1140–41.
42. See generally Identity and Immigration Status of 9/11 Terrorists, FAIR
(Jan.
2017)
http://www.fairus.org/issue/national-security/identity-andimmigration-status-911-terrorists (last visited Oct. 2, 2018) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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Forces to carry out limited immigration enforcement duties, all
focused on domestic security concerns. As a result of its 287(g)
activities, the state of Florida reported that it had detained
individuals apparently involved in “surveillance activities in
sensitive locations”; the state also reported conducting
investigations resulting in the arrests of unauthorized immigrants
working in restricted or secured areas of seaports, airports, and
nuclear plants. 43
A few other sub-federal jurisdictions soon followed suit and
signed 287(g) agreements; those jurisdictions included the state of
Alabama and the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department. 44
These initial agreements were also targeted in scope, focusing on
immigrants with criminal records or who otherwise presented a
threat to public safety. 45 In his July 2005 testimony in front of a
Homeland Security subcommittee, Paul Kilcoyne, Deputy
Assistant Director of ICE’s Office of Investigations, assured
Congressional members that the 287(g) program would remain
“focused on criminal organizations, those individuals who pose a
threat to the border security,” and not on “the landscape architect
that had the broken headlight.” 46
Three types of agreements developed. Under the first, a jail
enforcement model, deputized officers can only exercise their
delegated immigration functions on alleged noncitizens which
LEAs arrested and detained on separate state or local charges. The
second, a task force model, authorized deputized officers to perform
their immigration functions during the course of their daily
activities as patrol officers, detectives, or criminal investigators, or
in coordination with ICE in task force settings (for example,
43. See The 287(g) Program: Ensuring the Integrity of America’s Border
Security System through Federal-State Partnerships: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. On Mgmt., Integration, and Oversight of the H. Comm. on Homeland
Sec.,
109th
Cong.,
16
(2005)
[hereinafter
Kilcoyne
testimony],
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-109hhrg28332/pdf/CHRG-109hhrg28332.pdf
(statement of Testimony of Paul M. Kilcoyne, Deputy Assistant Director, Office of
Investigations, ICE).
44. See RANDY CAPPS ET AL., MIGRATION POL’Y INST., DELEGATION AND
DIVERGENCE: A STUDY OF 287(G) STATE AND LOCAL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 9
(2011) (discussing a brief history of 287(g)).
45. See id. (noting that Alabama and Florida signed similar targeted
agreements).
46. See id. (citing Kilcoyne testimony referenced later in this Article).
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working together on a gang-focused task force). Under the task
force model then, the officers could interrogate alleged noncitizens
they encountered “on the beat” and not just those who had been
arrested on separate charges. The third, a hybrid model, combined
elements of the jail enforcement and task force models, allowing
immigration enforcement both on the streets and at the jails. 47
Though it continued to be publicly advertised as focusing on
dangerous criminals and other public safety concerns, 48 the 287(g)
program experienced a significant expansion in 2006. In that year,
some 287(g) jurisdictions adopted a universal model of
enforcement, where the goal was to apprehend as many
unauthorized immigrants as possible, regardless of their criminal
records or dangerousness. The most visible example of this
universal enforcement focus was the 287(g) agreement signed by
Mecklenburg County, North Carolina. The county’s goal, as
articulated by Sheriff Jim Pendergraph, was to apprehend as
many unauthorized immigrants as possible, believing that
unauthorized immigrants committed crimes and drained public
resources. 49 Thus, the county viewed the 287(g) program as a
vehicle to identify for removal immigrants who had committed civil
immigration violations. 50 The county seemed to find at least some
degree of support for its universal enforcement model within ICE.
For example, Mecklenburg’s agreement, which became a model for
all new agreements signed from 2007 to mid-2009, 51 explicitly
states: “It is the intent of the parties that this agreement will result
in enhanced capacity to deal with immigration violators in the

47. See OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., THE PERFORMANCE OF 287(G) AGREEMENTS
REPORT UPDATE 3 (2010), https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_10124_Sep10.pdf (discussing progress of prior 287(g) agreements).
48. See CAPPS, supra note 44 (citing ICE’s 2007 fact sheet on delegating
Section 287(g) authority) (noting the broadened scope of the 287(g) program from
the priorities publicly known). ICE regularly updates the fact sheet, and this older
version is no longer available on the web.
49. See id. at 10 (noting the emergence of universal models of enforcement
in the southeast between 2006–2008).
50. See id. at 26 (citing Examining 287(g): The Role of State and Local Law
Enforcement in Immigration Law: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Homeland
Sec., 111th Cong. (2009)) (providing the statement of Charles A. Jenkins, Sheriff,
Frederick County, MD).
51. See id. at 10 (outlining the history of the 287(g) program).
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County.” 52 And ICE’s 2008 version of its program fact sheet
omitted previous language that had limited enforcement to
criminal immigrants and other security threats. 53
In 2007, the last year of the Bush administration, sub-federal
interest in the program increased substantially; in that year alone,
ICE signed twenty-six new agreements. 54 Together with the
enforcement expansion by some jurisdictions (switching from a
targeted model to a universal model), the program was poised for
significant growth during the Obama administration.
C. Agreements Under the Obama Administration (2008–2016)
During the Obama administration, the 287(g) program
continued the growth of the Bush years but it also experienced
contractions and restrictions, reflected in the fluctuating number
of agreements and the changing scope of authority delegated to
sub-federal jurisdictions. “The 287(g) program is an essential
component of DHS’ comprehensive immigration enforcement
strategy,” stated ICE Assistant Secretary John Morton. 55
Accordingly, the administration actively pursued signing new
287(g) agreements. In 2008, it signed twenty-eight new

52. See U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING 1
(2002), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/287gMOA/mecklenburgcountysheriffsoffice.pdf
(discussing the agreement made between ICE and Mecklenburg County, North
Carolina).
53. See CAPPS, supra note 44, at 10–11 (outlining the history of the 287(g)
program between 2006–2010).
54. See Rodriguez et al., A Program in Flux: New Priorities and
Implementation Challenges for 287(g), MIGRATION POL’Y INST. 3 (Mar. 2010),
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/program-flux-new-priorities-and-imple
men tation-challenges-287g (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (discussing the history of
the 287(g) program, the specifics of the 2009 template and questions of its
implementation) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
55. See Department of Homeland Security, Secretary Napolitano Announces
New Agreement for State and Local Immigration Enforcement Partnerships &
Adds 11 New Agreements, supra note 19 (noting the standardized agreement to
enter into 287(g) agreements as well as eleven new agreements to be implemented
across the country with local enforcement agencies) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).

1266

75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1253 (2018)

agreements; 56 at the peak of its 287(g) activity, the program had
seventy-seven active agreements (2009). 57
During these years of increased interest and activity,
Congressional funding for the program rose accordingly.
Appropriations started at $5 million (2006), grew to $15 million
(2007), then rose significantly to $42.1 million (2008) and $54
million (2009), before settling at $68 million (2010–2013). 58 These
federal funds were used to pay for the training of the deputized
officers and for program management and oversight. 59 Local
jurisdictions continued to pay for the salaries and other expenses
of their deputized officers (including expenses during the training
period), which constitute the largest costs of the 287(g) program. 60
As more sub-federal jurisdictions joined, the program became
more successful by at least one metric: increasing the number of
immigrants who are identified and placed into removal
proceedings. Between 2005 and 2010, 287(g) officers identified and
screened 186,000 noncitizens for potential removal. 61 But as these
numbers grew, so did criticism of the program. In a letter on behalf
of over 500 national, state, regional and local organizations,
Marielena Hincapie, Executive Director of National Immigration
Law Center, implored President Obama to terminate the program.
Citing egregious abuses by 287(g) jurisdictions, she argued, “Racial
profiling and other civil rights abuses by the local law enforcement
agencies that have sought out 287(g) powers have compromised
public safety, while doing nothing to solve the immigration
crisis.” 62 Law enforcement agencies also expressed concerns about
56. See Rodriguez, supra note 54, at 3 (discussing the recent trend of local
and state officials participating in immigration policies).
57. See Jennifer M. Chacón, A Diversion of Attention? Immigration Courts
and the Adjudication of Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights, 59 DUKE L.J. 1563,
1582 n.88 (2010) (noting the increase in agreements entered into).
58. See AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, THE 287(G) PROGRAM: AN OVERVIEW 2 (2017),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/the_28
7g_program_an_overview_0.pdf (detailing specifics of the different 287(g)
agreement types).
59. See id. (noting that federal funding for the 287(g) program hit a high in
FY 2010–2013).
60. See id. at 3 (discussing the authority of local agencies and the selection
process for local entities).
61. See CAPPS, supra note 44, at 10 (noting the expansion of the program in
the southeast region between 2006–2008).
62. Letter from Marielena Hincapie, Exec. Dir. of Nat’l Immigr. Law Ctr., to
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the program. After holding focus groups across the country that
included local police and after administering a written survey to
police chiefs attending a national police conference, the Police
Foundation63 found that a majority of participating police chiefs
believed that the costs of participating in the 287(g) program
outweighed the potential benefits, “where there is no criminal
nexus.” 64
In that same year, in response to a Congressional request, the
General Accountability Office (GAO) issued a detailed review of
the 287(g) program, in which the agency interviewed officials from
all sub-federal agencies participating in the program and reviewed
information provided by these agencies and ICE. 65 The GAO found
that ICE needed to impose more controls, to make sure that the
program operated as intended. Specifically, the GAO
recommended that ICE (1) document the program’s objectives,
(2) describe more fully the nature and extent of its supervision over
sub-federal jurisdictions, and (3) define what data sub-federal
jurisdictions should collect and how it should be collected and
reported. 66 By articulating standards for the program and
communicating those standards to participating sub-federal
agencies, ICE would be in a position to follow up to make sure that
the standards are being implemented. 67
President Barack Obama (Aug. 25, 2009) (on file with author).
63. The Police Foundation is “oldest nationally-known, non-profit,
non-partisan, and non-membership-driven organization dedicated to improving
America’s
most
noble
profession—policing.”
POLICE
FOUND.
https://www.policefoundation.org/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
64. See ANITA KHASHU, POLICE FOUND., THE ROLE OF LOCAL POLICE: STRIKING
A BALANCE BETWEEN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AND CIVIL LIBERTIES xii (2009),
https://www.policefoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Khashu-2009The-Role-of-Local-Police.pdf (highlighting the variance of immigration policies in
response to historically high rates of immigration).
65. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT:
BETTER CONTROLS NEEDED OVER PROGRAM AUTHORIZING STATE AND LOCAL
ENFORCEMENT
OF
FEDERAL
IMMIGRATION
LAWS
33
(2009),
https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09109.pdf (highlighting the need for better
oversight controls over programs authorizing local and state agencies to
participate in immigration enforcement).
66. See id. at 24 (recommending action items for the Assistant Secretary for
ICE).
67. See id. at xii (detailing the impetus for the study and recommendations
as a result of the findings).
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After this deluge of critical reports, immigrant advocates
hoped that the Obama administration would cancel the 287(g)
program. 68 Instead, in July 2009, DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano
announced that ICE would sign eleven new agreements. To
address critics’ concerns, ICE also announced that the program
would use a new standardized template for its agreements, that
would provide for closer federal supervision and focus the 287(g)
program on the removal of “dangerous criminals.” 69 Most of the
changes tracked the GAO’s recommendations. First, the template
articulated a set of enforcement priorities, making it clear that the
purpose of the 287(g) program is to identify and process for removal
“criminal aliens who pose a threat to public safety or a danger to
the community.” 70 The template also stated that ICE retains “sole
discretion” on how to manage its own resources and that LEAs
should manage their own allocation of resources according to ICE’s
three-tiered set of priorities. 71
Second, the template was much more specific in describing
ICE’s role in supervising LEAs. Under the task force model, an
LEA must ask on a case-by-case basis for permission to interrogate
and process a person solely based on immigration violations; 72 the
LEA must also ask in advance for ICE permission to conduct a
287(g) enforcement action. 73 The template also imposed new
responsibilities on ICE to provide LEAs with data and guidance in
specific situations. 74 Finally, the template specifies the kind of
information that LEAs are required to provide to ICE, with ICE

68. See Dawn Teo, After Being Ignored by White House, 521 Immigration
Groups Join to Protest Obama’s Inaction, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 27, 2009, 5:12
AM),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/dawn-teo/after-being-ignored-bywh_b_270451.html (last updated May 25, 2011) (last visited Sept. 18, 2018)
(reporting on responses to immigration policy inaction) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
69. See CAPPS, supra note 44, at 11 (detailing the new standardized
agreement under the Obama Administration).
70. See Rodriguez, supra note 54, at 12 (discussing enforcement priorities
and objectives).
71. Id.
72. See id. at 18 (discussing federal supervision).
73. See id. (noting how ICE monitors LEA action).
74. See id. (outlining the responsibilities of ICE to effectuate the new
programming).
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reserving the right to request specific tracking data or other
documents related to a specific arrest. 75
The general purpose of these templates, according to Secretary
Napolitano, was to “promote[] consistency across the board to
ensure that all of our state and local law enforcement partners are
using the same standards in implementing the 287(g) program.” 76
The new agreements would “support[] local efforts to protect public
safety by giving law enforcement the tools to identify and remove
dangerous criminal aliens.” 77 Accordingly, DHS required all
existing 287(g) jurisdictions to renegotiate their agreements to
conform with the template; new jurisdictions also had to agree to
use the template. 78
Did the template help the program achieve its desired
consistency and control? The Migration Policy Institute (MPI)
conducted an extensive review in which its researchers visited
seven 287(g) sites operating under the new agreements and
interviewed federal ICE officials. 79 It found that the template
changes did not have any “substantial effect on 287(g) priority
setting, program operations, . . . or community impacts.” 80 Rather,
decisions about enforcement priorities continued to be made at the
sub-federal levels, driven by local political pressures. For example,
in many communities in the southeast and southwest, growing
immigrant populations put political pressure on elected officials,
including sheriffs, to pursue different enforcement strategies. 81
The MPI study found that the universal enforcement model

75. See id. (describing required updates such as how aliens are processed,
how documentation errors are communicated, and notification requirements for
new detainers).
76. See Secretary Napolitano Announces New Agreement for State and Local
Immigration Enforcement Partnerships & Adds 11 New Agreements, supra note
19 (noting the standardization Memorandum of Agreements used to enter into
287(g) partnerships).
77. See id.
78. See CAPPS, supra note 44, at 11 (discussing the standardized immigration
agreements under the Obama administration).
79. See id. at 52–53 (noting the research questions and methodologies used
in analyzing the 287(g) programs).
80. Id. at 3.
81. See id. (providing examples of direct, targeting legislation adopted in
Arizona and Georgia).
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continued to be concentrated in the southeast, following the
example set by Mecklenburg County, North Carolina in 2006. 82
Though the template revisions did result in increased ICE
supervision, that ICE supervision did not influence local
enforcement priorities. For example, ICE supervisors signed off on
virtually all 287(g) detainer requests that LEAs issued, even if the
detainers were for immigrants charged with low priority crimes
and traffic offenses. 83 For jailhouse model agreements, ICE
supervision did not extend to officers who made the initial arrests.
Often those arresting officers worked for agencies without 287(g)
agreements and thus were not trained in immigration law or
subject to ICE supervision. “The lack of federal control over
arresting officers,” warned MPI, “opens the door to racial profiling
and pretextual arrests, especially in jurisdictions that place
immigration detainers universally.” 84 On a national level, MPI
found that despite ICE’s attempts to refocus the program on
serious criminal offenders, “the program is not targeted primarily
or even mostly toward serious offenders.” 85 Specifically, half of the
detainers issued through the program were for people who were
arrested for misdemeanors or traffics, even though these offenses
were not considered priority offenses, according to the 2009
template. 86
Beyond the template standardization, the Obama
administration also made other policy changes to try to assert
more control over the program and respond to critics’ complaints.
In 2012, the administration announced that it would not renew
any task force model agreements, citing the greater efficiency of
other enforcement programs, including Secure Communities. 87
The administration was likely also responding to criticism that the
task force model was more prone to racial profiling and other
abuses. By delegating more powers to LEAs and allowing them to
82. See id. at 2 (highlighting the study’s findings).
83. See id. at 3 (noting that ICE allowed local agents to set enforcement
priorities).
84. Id. at 2.
85. Id.
86. See id. (noting that half of the detainees were considered Level 3, the
lowest priority ranking).
87. See FY 2012: ICE Announces Year-End Removal Numbers, supra note 7
(highlighting the priorities for removal like convicted criminals).
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exercise those powers in a broader geographic jurisdiction, critics
charged that the task force model allows local officers to engage in
racial profiling and other illegal practices without even requiring
the pretense of a separate criminal charge. 88 The elimination of the
task force model (and the related hybrid model) likely had more
symbolic, rather than practical, impact. In its 2011 in-depth
assessment, the MPI found that the 287(g) program was primarily
a jail-based program. For example, in FY 2010, “jail models
accounted for 90 percent of detainers issued, while hybrid models
accounted for 8 percent and task force models just 2 percent.” 89
As another control measure, the administration also actively
investigated complaints received about specific 287(g)
participants, and in two high-profile cases, ICE revoked the LEAs’
permission to participate in the program, based on findings of
misconduct. The more straightforward revocation was in
Alamance County, North Carolina. After receiving complaints that
the Alamance County Sheriff’s Office (ACSO) engaged in
discriminatory policing and unconstitutional searches and
seizures, the Department of Justice in 2010 started a two-year
investigation. Among DOJ’s findings: the ACSO was four to ten
times more likely to stop Latino drivers than non-Latino drivers;
the ACSO located checkpoints in majority Latino neighborhoods
and treated stopped drivers differently based on their ethnicity;
the ACSO improperly detained Latinos for immigration
enforcement purposes after they had already posted bond; and the
ACSO’s discrimination was intentional and rooted in Sheriff Terry
S. Johnson’s prejudices against Latinos 90 (Sheriff Johnson

88. See Ted Hesson, As One Immigration Enforcement Program Fades Away,
Another Rises, ABC NEWS (Dec. 27, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/ABC_
Univision/News/immigration-enforcement-program-287g-scaledback/story?id=18077757 (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (noting the shift in
immigration programming) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review);
see also CAPPS, supra note 44, at 2 (discussing how lack of federal control allows
for racial profiling and pretextual arrests).
89. CAPPS, supra note 44, at 2.
90. See generally Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Asst. Attn’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t
of Justice, to Clyde B. Albright, Cty. Attn’y, Alamance Cty. & Chuck Kitchen,
Turrentine Law Firm 2 (Sept. 18, 2012) [hereinafter Letter from Thomas E.
Perez], https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2012/09/18/acso_find
ings_9-18-12.pdf.
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continues to serve as the county’s sheriff). 91 Based on the DOJ’s
findings, ICE terminated its 287(g) agreement with the county. 92
The more complicated revocation involved the Maricopa
County Sheriff’s Office (MCSO), located in Arizona, because it was
done in stages, over several years. From 1993–2016, Sheriff Joe
Arpaio, a controversial figure who embraced his reputation as
“America’s Toughest Sheriff,” headed the MCSO. During his
multiple terms as sheriff, he was accused of engaging in racial
profiling against Hispanics and in other civil rights violations as
he ordered his deputies to enforce federal immigration laws. He
lost multiple lawsuits, requiring the county to pay millions of
dollars in legal fees. 93 Against this background, MCSO’s task force
agreement was revoked in 2009, but its jailhouse agreement was
renewed. 94 In 2011, DOJ issued a report finding that MCSO had
engaged in a “pattern or practice of unconstitutional policing.” 95
Specifically, DOJ found evidence that MCSO engaged in racial
profiling of Latinos, unlawfully stopped, detained, and arrested
91. See Natalie Allison Janicello, Alamance County May Rejoin 287(g),
TIMES-NEWS (June 1, 2017, 5:49 PM), http://www.thetimesnews.com/news/
20170601/alamance-county-may-rejoin-287g (last updated June 1, 2017) (last
visited Sept. 18, 2018) (noting the county’s renewed decision to participate in the
immigration identification program) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
92. See Gustavo Valdes & Thom Patterson, Feds Accuse North Carolina
Sheriff’s Office of Racial Profiling, CNN (Sept. 20, 2012, 11:18 AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2012/09/20/justice/north-carolina-justice-immigration/
index.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (reporting on instances of racial profiling
in North Carolina) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
93. See Michael Kiefer & Rebekah L. Sander, Maricopa County Voters Oust
Sheriff Joe Arpaio, Elect Paul Penzone, AZCENTRAL (Nov. 8, 2016, 9:22 PM),
https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/elections/2016/11/08/maricopacounty-sheriff-joe-arpaio-paul-penzone-election-results/93169028/ (last updated
Nov. 9, 2016) (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (discussing the shift in sheriff control to
one that values transparency) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
94. See Stephen Lemons, Joe Arpaio Scores 287(g) Jails Agreement in ICE
Announcement, ICE Head Says Arpaio Has No Federal Authority to Continue
NEW
TIMES
(Oct.
16,
2009,
10:00
AM),
Sweeps,
PHX.
http://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/news/joe-arpaio-scores-287-g-jails-agreementin-ice-announcement-ice-head-says-arpaio-has-no-federal-authority-to-continuesweeps-6499142 (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (noting the continuation of 287(g)
programming in many counties including Maricopa County despite allegations
against the Sheriff’s office) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
95. See Letter from Thomas E. Perez, supra note 90, at 2 (noting the findings
of the investigation into the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office).
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Latinos, and unlawfully retaliated against individuals who
complained or criticized its policies and practices. 96 It was only
after DOJ issued its report that ICE terminated MCSO’s jailhouse
287(g) agreement and limited its access to the Secure Communities
program as well. 97
These high-profile revocations, together with other problems
in implementing the 287(g) program, decreased interest in the
287(g) program from both the federal and sub-federal levels. At the
end of 2016, there were only thirty-four active 287(g) agreements. 98
III. 287(g) Agreements in the Trump Era: On the Ground
President Trump’s interest in the 287(g) program was
apparent from the beginning of his administration, as reflected in
his January 2017 executive orders calling for the expansion of the
program. 99 In the Border Security and Immigration Enforcement
Executive Order, he directed the DHS Secretary to enter into more
287(g) agreements and to “structure each agreement . . . in the
manner that provides the most effective model for enforcing
Federal immigration laws and obtaining operational control over
the border for that jurisdiction.” 100 That latter language opened the
door to resurrecting the task force model that the Obama
administration eliminated. 101
96. See id. (discussing the targeting of Latinos in particular by the Sherriff’s
Office).
97. See Secretary Napolitano Announces New Agreement for State and Local
Immigration Enforcement Partnerships & Adds 11 New Agreements, supra note
19.
98. See Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and
Nationality
Act,
U.S.
IMMIGR.
&
CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT,
https://www.ice.gov/287g (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (outlining the provisions of
the delegation of authority under 287(g)) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
99. See generally Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793 (Jan. 25, 2017)
(discussing changes to border security and immigration enforcement); Exec.
Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017) (noting immigration policy
shifts internally in the United States).
100. See Exec. Order No. 13,767, supra note 99, at 8795 (detailing changes in
border security).
101. See FY 2012: ICE Announces Year-End Removal Numbers, supra note 7
(highlighting how the broadened priorities fit within the earlier language).
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Shortly after the executive orders were released, then-DHS
Secretary John Kelly issued memos implementing, among other
things, the 287(g) expansion. In his memo implementing the
Border Security executive order, Secretary Kelly directed ICE to
“expand the 287(g) Program to include all qualified law
enforcement agencies that request to participate and meet all
program requirements.” 102 The Kelly memo also authorized
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to “accept State services and
take other actions as appropriate to carry out immigration
enforcement pursuant to section 287(g) of the INA.” 103 That
language appears to authorize CBP, as well as ICE, to enter into
287(g) agreements.
The Trump administration moved quickly to implement its
plans, signing twenty-five new agreements in 2017 alone. 104 These
new agreements nearly doubled the thirty-four agreements that
remained active from the Obama administration; 105 seventeen of
these new agreements were signed with Texas LEAs. 106 As of
November 2017, there were an additional thirty-nine LEAs that
were interested in joining the program. 107 If all of these interested
102. See Read the Memos Signed by DHS Secretary Kelly on New Guidelines
for Deporting Illegal Immigrants, supra note 8 (including memos from Kelly
regarding more detailed plans on expanded enforcement policies for the removal
of immigrants).
103. Id.
104. The number of active agreements at any given time can be tracked. See
Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and Nationality
Act, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, https://www.ice.gov/287g (last
visited Sept. 18, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
105. See Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and
Nationality Act, supra note 98 (listing the participating entities).
106. ICE’s press release states that the Trump Administration signed
eighteen new Texas agreements in 2017. ICE Announces 18 New 287(g)
Agreements in Texas, U.S. IMMIGR. AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (July 31, 2017),
https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/ice-announces-18-new-287g-agreements-texas
(last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
Technically, however, one of those agreements with Lubbock County was signed
in 2016 while the Obama administration was still in office, and thus is not
counted in the 2017 numbers for purposes of this Article. Delegation of
Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and Nationality Act, U.S.
IMMIGR. AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, https://www.ice.gov/287g (last visited Sept.
18, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
107. See Rosenberg & Levinson, supra note 3 (discussing the delegation of
authority to police departments across the United States) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); See generally REUTERS, 287(G) GRAPHICS DATA
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LEAs sign agreements, there would be over ninety active 287(g)
jurisdictions, the largest in the program’s history108 and with
expansive geographical reach. 109
Figure 1: Expansion of the 287(g) Program Under the
Trump Administration

(Blue=Obama agreements at end of 2016, Red=Trump signed
agreements in 2017, and Yellow=Interested LEA applicants as of
Nov. 2017)
A. Changing Profile of Deportees
With a potentially record high number of LEAs signing
agreements, the number of immigrants who will be identified and
(2017), http://fingfx.thomsonreuters.com/gfx/rngs/TRUMP-EFFECT-IMMIGRA
TION-POLICE/010051YZ4FG/287ggraphics%20data.pdf.
108. The previous high point in 287(g) participation was in 2011, when there
were seventy-two active agreements. See Chacón, supra note 57, at 1582 n.88.
109. See Figure 1.
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placed into removal proceedings as a result of 287(g) operations
under President Trump will inevitably increase. But we can also
expect to see a change in the profile of those immigrants who are
placed in removal through contact with the 287(g) program. With
the institution of very broad enforcement priorities at the federal
level, we should expect that immigration enforcement at the
sub-federal level will similarly result in the arrest and removal of
more unauthorized immigrants without criminal records.
When he revoked the Obama administration’s immigration
enforcement priorities, 110 President Trump replaced them with
incredibly broad priorities: any removable alien who has been
convicted of any crime, charged with a crime, committed acts that
constitute a crime, engaged in any fraud or misrepresentation
before a government agency, abused public benefits, has a final
order of removal, or “[i]n the judgment of an immigration officer,
otherwise pose[s] a risk to public safety or national security.” 111
Trump’s policy did not prioritize between these categories, leading
Professor David Martin to observe, “[a]n old canard applies: [w]hen
everything is a priority, nothing is a priority. In practice, this
feature gives individual agents wide latitude to follow their own
preferences—or perhaps biases.” 112 Moreover, regarding the
criminal categories, Martin noted
[t]here is no distinction between felonies and misdemeanors,
and even people charged but not yet tried get thrown into this
capacious criminal pot. Indeed, there doesn’t even need to be a
charge—just an immigration agent’s determination that the
person committed a criminal act, even years ago—presumably
including even the misdemeanor of entering the US without
inspection. 113

110. See generally Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017)
(replacing the Obama administration’s removal priorities with a new list of
removal priorities).
111. See id. at 8800 (providing enforcement priorities).
112. See David A. Martin, Trump’s Order on the Deportation of Undocumented
Residents, Annotated by an Immigration Law Expert, VOX (Jan 31, 2017, 10:13
AM), https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2017/1/28/14416616/executive-order-immigrantssanctuary-trump (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (annotating the executive order
intended to enhance public safety inside the United States) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
113. Id.
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In his February 2017 memo implementing these priorities,
then-DHS Secretary Kelly stated: “The Department no longer will
exempt classes or categories of removable aliens from potential
enforcement.” 114
Enforcement statistics from 2017 show the impact of these
new priorities. In its FY 2017 report, ICE touts its increased
interior arrests and removals based on those arrests (as compared
with previous years under the Obama administration). 115 The
agency also noted a substantial increase in its administrative
arrests (arrests solely based on a civil immigration violation) to
143,470 in 2017, from 110,104 in FY 2016 under the Obama
administration. 116 The agency attributes this increase to the
administration’s new priorities and specifically to its decision not
to exempt any category of immigrants from enforcement.
Anecdotal information also reflects the impact of the new
enforcement priorities. The media reports regularly on the
heart-wrenching deportation of immigrants who have lived in the
country for many years, established successful careers, and leave
behind U.S. citizen family members. For example, in April 2017,
Roberto Beristain was deported to Mexico, after illegally crossing
into the U.S. nearly twenty years prior. 117 In those twenty years,
he married a U.S. citizen, had three U.S. citizen children, and
owned and operated a popular restaurant, Eddie’s Steak Shed in
Granger, Indiana. 118 Significantly, he had no criminal record, but
despite years of trying to obtain legal status, he had a final order
114. Read the Memos Signed by DHS Secretary Kelly on New Guidelines for
Deporting Illegal Immigrants, supra note 8.
115. See FISCAL YEAR 2017 ICE ENFORCEMENT AND REMOVAL OPERATIONS
REPORT,
U.S.
IMMIGR.
&
CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT
12
(2017),
https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Report/2017/iceEndOfYearFY2
017.pdf (summarizing the U.S. Immigration activities in 2017). ICE notes,
however, that total removal numbers are down compared to previous years, due
to a decrease in border apprehensions.
116. Id.
117 See Anderson Cooper, Deported Man’s Wife and Friends Rethink Voting for
Trump, CBS NEWS (May 7, 2017), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trumpimmigration-crackdown-causes-some-to-rethink-their-vote/ (last visited July 28,
2018) (noting that in those twenty years, he had been issued a temporary work
permit and a social security number) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
118. See id. (reporting on the impact of Trump’s immigration policies in the
community in Indiana).
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of removal, which made him a priority for deportation under the
Trump administration. 119 The story of Jorge Garcia of Lincoln
Park, Michigan, is similar. He was brought illegally to the U.S.
from Mexico as a child, nearly thirty years ago. 120 He, too, married
a U.S. citizen and had two U.S. citizen children, whom he
supported through his work as a landscaper. 121 Mr. Garcia had no
criminal record and tried to obtain a green card, based on his
marriage; however, his immigration attorney filed the wrong
paperwork, resulting in a removal order. 122 During the Obama
administration, he was allowed to remain in the U.S. pending
annual meetings with ICE; in 2017, however, he was deported to
Mexico. 123
Regarding the 287(g) program specifically, we can expect to
find similar shifts in enforcement, with more immigrants without
criminal records being identified and placed in removal as a result
of their 287(g) encounters. On its website, ICE continues to refer
to its mission to “ensure enforcement efforts remain focused on
criminal aliens, particularly those who pose the greatest risk to
public safety.” 124 Yet given that federal enforcement priorities have
changed under the Trump administration and that LEAs are
required to abide by those federal priorities, we will likely see a
magnification of the trend that the MPI observed in its 2011 study:
that LEAs set enforcement priorities for their individual 287(g)
119. See Mayra Cuevas, Undocumented Husband of Indiana Trump
Supporter Deported to Mexico, CNN (Apr. 6, 2017, 8:47 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2017/04/05/us/undocumented-husband-deported/index.html
(last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (noting the effect of Trump’s policies on families in
Indiana) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
120. See Christina Caron, Michigan Father Deported After Living in U.S. for
30 Years, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 16, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/16/us/
man-deported-jorge-garcia.html (discussing the impact of the deportation of a
Michigan father on his family) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
121. See id. (noting Mr. Garcia was employed and had no criminal record).
122. See id. (discussing Mr. Garcia’s multiple removal orders).
123. See id. (noting that Mr. Garcia was one of 226,119 individuals that ICE
removed in FY 2017).
124. See Updated Facts on ICE’s 287(g) Program, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT, https://www.ice.gov/factsheets/287g-reform (last updated Jan. 10,
2018) (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (referring to the program’s history and the
reasons why the 2009 template changes were made) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).

287(g) AGREEMENTS IN THE TRUMP ERA

1279

programs, influenced by local political pressure. 125 In fact, with
this broadening of federal enforcement priorities, the program may
become more attractive to LEAs interested in universal
enforcement.
B. More Powerful Forms of Agreements
Through executive orders and agency memos, the Trump
administration has encouraged the use of alternative 287(g)
agreement models: the task force model of enforcement and a
border patrol model agreement. 126 None of the new agreements
signed by this administration in 2017 employ either model, but if
future agreements used these alternative models, the result would
give LEAs more expansive powers. The implications of that
expansion are explored in this section.
As noted earlier, the task force model has deep roots in the
program. Before the Obama administration discontinued it, the
task force model was used predominantly by state and city LEAs,
while counties favored the jail or hybrid models. This alignment
made sense as counties usually operate the local jails, whereas city
police departments make arrests and detain individuals only for a
short time before transferring them to county jails for longer-term
detentions. 127 If the Trump administration resurrects the task
force model, it could, of course, deviate from the Obama
administration’s practices. But absent any indication that it plans
to do so and given the interest from at least some 287(g) applicants
in the task force model, 128 it is informative to understand how this
model operated under the Obama administration.
The Prince William Police Department signed a typical task
force agreement in 2009 and gave 287(g) trained officers the usual
powers of a jailhouse agreement: the power to interrogate
125. See supra notes 79–82 and accompanying text (discussing the change in
priorities from the Obama administration to the Trump administration).
126. See supra notes 92–94 and accompanying text (describing the Trump
Administration’s adoption of new agreements).
127. See Rodriguez, supra note 54, at 5 (noting the history and context of
287(g)).
128. See Rosenberg & Levinson, supra note 3 (noting the interest of Bensalem,
Pennsylvania in signing a task force model agreement).
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detainees about their immigration status; serve immigration
arrest warrants; prepare evidence related to immigration
proceedings; issue immigration detainer requests, prepare
charging documents; and transport detainees to immigration
detention facilities. 129 As a result of the task force agreement, these
officers had the additional authority to: interview and arrest
someone solely based on an immigration violation (with ICE
approval); arrest for immigration felonies without a warrant if the
individual is likely to escape; and arrest for any federal crime
committed in the officer’s presence. 130
The distinguishing characteristic of the task force model then
was the authority it gave to LEAs to investigate and prosecute
based on immigration offenses alone, without needing the
predicate criminal offense required by the jail house model (where
an LEA could only exercise its delegated immigration powers on
immigrants detained on separate, non-immigration charges). This
broad discretion that could be exercised “on the beat” raised
concerns that the model was particularly vulnerable to racial
profiling and other illegal abuses. These concerns, coupled with the
rising utility of the Secure Communities program, motivated the
Obama administration in 2012 to retire the task force model from
the 287(g) program. 131 President Trump resurrecting this model
would raise similar concerns about racial profiling.
The second alternative model that the Trump administration
has encouraged would allow Customs and Border Protection to
sign agreements with LEAs under the 287(g) program.
Administration officials have not spoken further about what a
CBP-signed agreement might look like, nor is there precedent for
this kind of agreement in the program’s history. 132 But based on
129. See U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENF’T, MEMORANDUM OF
UNDERSTANDING 3 (2009) (authorizing LEA tasks supporting federal immigration
initiatives).
130. See id. (discussing the agreement made between ICE and Prince William
County, Virginia).
131. See Kanyakrit Vongkiatkajorn, How the Trump Administration Is Using
Local Cops to Widen Its Immigration Dragnet, MOTHER JONES (Dec. 4, 2017, 6:00
AM), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2017/12/how-the-trump-administra
tion-is-using-local-cops-to-widen-its-immigration-dragnet/ (last visited Sept. 18,
2018) (discussing the policies the Trump administration is using to expand its
immigration objectives) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
132. All of the 287(g) agreements to date have been signed by Immigration
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the CBP’s powers and authority, we can make some educated
guesses about how this kind of agreement might operate. The
CBP’s mission is “[t]o safeguard America’s borders thereby
protecting the public from dangerous people and materials while
enhancing the Nation’s global economic competitiveness by
enabling legitimate trade and travel.” 133 Looking at the CBP’s
specific responsibilities related to immigration and the resources
that LEAs control, the most obvious operations where CBP could
delegate authority and receive assistance would be in border
patrols. While it would be logistically difficult and expensive for
LEAs to assist with actual line watches (where CBP agents
monitor the physical land border), LEAs could provide support
through traffic checks, traffic observation, city patrols and
transportation checks. They could also do joint operations with
CBP related to anti-smuggling activities. 134 Related to these new
operations, CBP could delegate to LEAs powers associated with the
task force model: the powers to interrogate, arrest, and process for
removal based on evidence of civil immigration offenses. 135
An agreement with CBP would obviously give an LEA new
powers in a broad context, especially if combined with an
additional agreement with ICE. The general concerns that exist
with any broad expansion of 287(g) powers apply here: will the
newly deputized officers receive adequate training to carry out
their new duties effectively? Will there be sufficient federal
controls to prevent racial profiling and other illegal acts? Will local
immigrant communities and immigrant advocacy groups be
consulted in the implementation of the program? But because CBP
has been recognized to have extra-constitutional powers within its
and Customs Enforcement as the supervising federal agency. See Delegation of
Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and Nationality Act, supra
note 98 (updating the changes to 287(g)) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
133. About CBP, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION (Nov. 21, 2016),
https://www.cbp.gov/about# (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
134. CBP conducts these activities as part of its border patrol activities. See
Along U.S. Borders, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION (2018),
https://www.cbp.gov/border-security/along-us-borders (last visited Sept. 18, 2018)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
135. See supra note 129 and accompanying text (listing powers available to
LEAs).
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special jurisdiction (100 miles of any external boundary of the
U.S. 136), there are special questions that a CBP agreement would
raise. For example, CBP has authority to operate immigration
checkpoints, pulling over individuals when its agents have
“reasonable suspicion” that an immigration violation or crime has
occurred. 137 Moreover, CBP agents can enter private property
without a warrant (except for dwellings) within twenty-five miles
of any border. 138 Would these extra-constitutional powers transfer
over to LEAs? If so, what measures would CBP and LEAs take to
prevent abuse of these powers?
C. Civil Rights Enforced?
As we consider the impact of the Trump Administration on the
287(g) program, perhaps the biggest question is how the
administration will respond to allegations and evidence of racial
profiling and other illegal practices by program participants. The
vulnerability of the program to racial profiling, illegal searches,
and other abuses has been widely documented; and as the Trump
administration seeks to expand the program, those abuses will
occur. The question then becomes, how will the administration
respond? The evidence thus far strongly suggests that the
administration does not prioritize civil rights in the context of
immigration law enforcement. 139
The vulnerability of the 287(g) program to racial profiling has
been well-documented. The DOJ’s findings of racial profiling and
other abuses committed by Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office (AZ)
and the Alamance County Sheriff’s Office (NC) have already been
analyzed. 140 Academic studies have found similar evidence of
136. 8 CFR § 287.1(b).
137. See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION’S
(CBP’S) 100-MILE RULE 1 (discussing limits on ICE agents’ authority).
138. See id. (outlining the details of CBP’s authority) see also Authority of U.S.
Customs and Border Protection Agents: An Overview, AMERICAN IMMIGRATION
COUNCIL
(2012),
https://www.american
immigrationcouncil.org/sites
/default/files/research/CBP_Overview_022112.pdf (noting the authority of CBP).
139. See supra Part IV.A (discussing the Trump administration’s prioritizing
immigration enforcement over civil rights).
140. See supra notes 90–97 and accompanying text (discussing the DOJ’s
finding of racial profiling).
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racial profiling once 287(g) programs are implemented within a
jurisdiction. For example, when the Frederick County Sheriff’s
Office (MD) implemented its 287(g) program in 2008, it started
arresting eleven to thirteen more Hispanics per month than would
be expected without the program. 141 This finding was based on
data compiled from FCSO’s individual arrest records for the period
between January 1, 2006 and December 31, 2013, using
difference-in-difference estimates. 142 Based on these findings, the
researcher concluded that there was a “shift in attention by the
FCSO away from the white and black community toward the
Hispanic community following the implementation of the 287(g)
program.” 143
When the Trump Administration does receive complaints of
LEA bad acts, compelling evidence suggests that it will not
necessarily prioritize civil rights enforcement or view racial
profiling as a negative. Candidate Trump, in his speech
announcing his bid for the presidency, engaged in an infamous
example of racial profiling when he described Mexican immigrants
as drug dealers and rapists, though studies show that first
generation immigrants commit crimes at a lower rate than
native-born Americans. 144 During that speech, he said:
When Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending their best.
They’re not sending you. . . . They’re sending people that have
lots of problems, and they’re bringing those problems with us.
They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists.
And some, I assume, are good people. 145

141. See Michael Coon, Local Immigration Enforcement and Arrests of the
Hispanic Population, 5 J. ON MIGRATION & HUM. SECURITY 645, 657 (2017),
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/233150241700500305 (noting the
impact of immigration policy changes on the white people).
142. See id. at 651 (discussing the data collection process).
143. See id. at 656 (highlighting the impact immigration policy changes have
had on the Hispanic community).
144. See Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Donald Trump’s False Comments Connecting
Mexican Immigrants and Crime, WASH. POST (July 8, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2015/07/08/donald-trumpsfalse-comments-connecting-mexican-immigrants-and-crime/?utm_term=.6e044818d4
6a (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (pointing out the falsities in Trumps immigration
discussions) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
145. Id.
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Zooming in closer to the 287(g) program itself, there is more
evidence of the administration’s disregard for racial profiling
concerns. In the spring of 2017, the administration approached
Sheriff Terry Johnson of Alamance County (NC) and invited the
county to apply to participate again in the 287(g) program. 146
Sheriff Johnson was the sheriff of Alamance County Sheriff’s
Office when ICE revoked its 287(g) agreement in 2012; that
revocation was based on DOJ findings that the ACSO had engaged
in intentional and illegal racial profiling, rooted in Sheriff
Johnson’s prejudice against Latinos. 147 Admittedly, the DOJ
lawsuit against ACSO was dismissed in federal court, but the
specific circumstances need to be understood: to avoid further
appeals, ACSO settled, agreeing to implement bias-free policing,
citizen-complaint, and data-collection policies. 148 The ACSO’s
troubled record on civil rights and the continued leadership of
Sheriff Johnson should have given the Trump administration
pause, but instead, the administration reached out and invited the
department to re-apply for 287(g) participation. 149
The most damning evidence, however, is President Trump’s
pardon of Sheriff Joe Arpaio in August 2017. 150 Sheriff Arpaio led
146. See Natalie Allison Janicello, Alamance County May Rejoin 287(g),
(June
1,
2017,
5:49
PM),
TIMES-NEWS
http://www.thetimesnews.com/news/20170601/alamance-county-may-rejoin-287g
(last updated June 1, 2017) (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (noting that Alamance
County may rejoin the 287(g) program) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
147. See supra notes 90–92 (detailing the DOJ’s findings, including unlawful
detainers).
148. See Sarah Willets, The Alamance County Sheriff’s Office Was Booted
from a Federal Immigration Program over Accusations of Discrimination. Now It
Wants to Rejoin., INDY WEEK: NEWS (Nov. 9, 2017, 1:56 PM),
https://www.indyweek.com/news/archives/2017/11/09/the-alamance-countysheriffs-office-was-booted-from-a-federal-immigration-program-overaccusations-of-discrimination-now-it-wants-to-rejoin (last visited Sept. 18, 2018)
(discussing Alamance’s desire to rejoin the 287(g) program after being removed
from the program because of discrimination) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
149. See id. (reporting that ICE asked Alamance to rejoin).
150. See Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Maggie Haberman, Trump Pardons Joe
Arpaio, Who Became Face of Crackdown on Illegal Immigration, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/25/us/politics/joe-arpaio-trumppardon-sheriff-arizona.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (discussing Trump’s
pardon of an Arizona sheriff known for harsh conditions in his county jails) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office when the Obama
administration revoked its 287(g) agreements, based on evidence
that the sheriff and his deputies engaged in racial profiling in
implementing their 287(g) responsibilities. 151 But the Sheriff’s
legal problems were not limited to the 287(g) program. In 2007,
Sheriff Arpaio and the MCSO were sued by a Mexican national
with a valid tourist visa who was wrongfully detained for nine
hours on suspicion of violating immigration laws. 152 The lawsuit
became a class action filed on behalf of Latino drivers in Maricopa
County. 153 After four years of litigation, a federal judge in 2011
ordered the defendants to stop enforcing civil immigration laws,
ruling that they lacked the legal authority to do so. 154 Over the next
six years, Sheriff Arpaio continued to defy the federal order,
ordering his deputies to make immigration-based stops and lying
under oath. 155 In 2017, the sheriff was convicted in a federal bench
trial of criminal contempt of court and faced a possible six-month
jail sentence. 156
In announcing his pardon, President Trump tweeted, “I am
pleased to inform you that I have just granted a full Pardon to
85-year-old American patriot Sheriff Joe Arpaio. He kept Arizona
safe!” 157 Political analysts opined that the President was sending a
151. See supra notes 93–97 and accompanying text (discussing the allegations
against the Maricopa Sheriff’s Office prior to their 287(g) agreement being
revoked).
152. See Ortega-Melendres v. Arpaio, 836 F. Supp. 2d 959, 980–81 (D. Ariz.
2011) (describing Ortega-Melendres’s multiple interactions with local authorities
during his detainment).
153. See id. at 993 (stating that the certified class included “[a]ll Latino
persons who, since January, 2007, have been or will be in the future, stopped,
detained, questioned or searched by MCSO agents while driving or sitting in a
vehicle on a public roadway or parking area in Maricopa County, Arizona.”).
154. See id. at 972 (“Local law enforcement officers, however, do not have the
‘inherent authority’ to investigate civil immigration violations, including status
violations.” (quoting United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 362 (9th Cir. 2011)).
155. See Hirschfeld & Haberman, supra note 150 (discussing Arpaio’s civil
contempt charge).
156. See Tom Jackman, How Ex-Sheriff Joe Arpaio Wound Up Facing Jail
Time before Trump Pardoned Him, WASH. POST (Aug. 25, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/true-crime/wp/2017/08/25/how-ex-sheriffjoe-arpaio-wound-up-facing-jail-time-before-trump-pardoned-him/?utm_term=.c
61618111a24 (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (discussing the history of the
proceedings against Arpaio) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
157. Hirschfeld & Haberman, supra note 150.
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message to his political base, who share Arpaio’s immigration
positions and consider him a hero. 158 But some analysts suggested
that the pardon had a more targeted audience: reassuring sheriffs
across the country who feared possible legal problems if they
cooperate with federal immigration enforcement. 159 For immigrant
advocates and others monitoring the 287(g) program, the pardon
represented damning evidence of the administration’s disdain for
civil rights enforcement in the immigration law context. 160
IV. Conclusion
This Article has analyzed the differences, actual and expected,
between the Trump administration’s implementation of the 287(g)
program and that of his predecessors. Those differences—the
identification of more removable immigrants without criminal
records, the use of more powerful agreement forms, and grave
concerns about this administration’s commitment to civil rights
enforcement—have been analyzed separately and in some detail.
But it is the combination of these policy differences that is
powerful, providing a troubling picture of what the 287(g) program
will look like under the Trump administration. In essence, the
program will be a supercharged version of what operated under
Presidents Bush or Obama, with few federal controls and little
federal interest in those controls. The end result will be the
magnification of the program’s flaws as it operated in previous
iterations, on a larger scale and reaching more jurisdictions.
***
158. See David Z. Morris, Trump, Playing to His Base, Pardons
26,
2017),
Anti-Immigrant
Sheriff
Joe
Arpaio,
FORTUNE (Aug.
http://fortune.com/2017/08/26/donald-trump-pardons-joe-arpaio/ (last visited
Sept. 18, 2018) (reporting that Trump’s pardon of Arpaio was aimed toward his
core supporters) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
159. See Dara Lind, Trump Just Pardoned the Infamous Anti-Immigrant
Ex-Sheriff Joe Arpaio, VOX (Aug. 25, 2017), https://www.vox.com/policy-andpolitics/2017/8/22/16151256/trump-pardon-arpaio (last updated Aug. 25, 2017,
8:29 PM) (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (highlighting the impact of Arpaio’s pardon)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
160. See id. (“Arpaio was convicted of violating a judge’s order by doing
something the Trump administration’s trying to pressure sheriffs around the
country to do now.”).

